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Abstract. In the work of Lorenz we find an initial phase of great concordance with 
Uexkülls theory of animals’ surrounding-world (Umweltlehre), followed by a 
progressive distance and by the occurrence of more and more critical statements. 
The moment of greater cohesion between Lorenz and Uexküll is represented by 
the work Der Kumpan, which is focused on the concept of companion, functional 
circles, social Umwelt. The great change in Lorenz’ evaluation of Uexküll is 
marked by the conference of 1948 Referat über Jakob von Uexküll, where Lorenz 
highlights the vitalist position of Uexküll. In the works of the years after World 
War II, the influence of the Estonian Biologist greatly diminishes, even though 
Lorenz continues to express his admiration for particular studies and concepts of 
Uexküll. References to Uexküll’s work are less and far in between, while the 
difference is highlighted between the uexküllian theoretical frame (vitalistic) and 
Lorenz’s one (Darwinian and evolutionist). The two main critical lines of argu-
ment developed by Lorenz in this process are the biological and the epistemo-
logical one: on the biological side Lorenz heavily criticizes Uexküll’s vitalism and 
his faith in harmonizing forces and supernatural factors (which leads to concepts 
such as the perfect fusion of all biological species in their environment and the 
absence of rudimentary organs). On the epistemological side, Lorenz, arguing 
from the point of view of the critical realism, accuses Uexküll of postulating the 
separateness of all living beings, a separateness which is due to the Kantian idea 
that every subject of knowledge and action is imprisoned in the transcendental 
circle of its representations and attitudes. 
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Introduction 
  
The aim of this article is to highlight the relationship between the etho-
logy of Konrad Lorenz and the philosophy and work of Jakob von Uex-
küll. The works of Lorenz with references to Uexküll have been divided 
into three groups. These three groups will be discussed separately.  
1) The first group includes the works written before World War II: 
Der Kumpan in der Umwelt der Vögel (Lorenz 1935), partially 
translated into English as Companionship in Bird Life in 1957 
(Lorenz 1964[1935])1, and Die angeborenen Formen möglicher 
Erfahrung (The Innate Forms of Potential Experience; Lorenz 1943).  
2) The second group is formed by a single yet very relevant work, the 
unpublished conference paper Referat über Jakob von Uexküll, of 
1948.  
3) The third group includes the writings dating to the period after 
World War II, specifically Die Rückseite des Spiegel (published in 
1973; translated into English as Behind the Mirror in 1977), Die 
Naturwissenschaft vom Menschen: eine Einführung in die ver-
gleichende Verhaltensforschung: das “russische Manuskript” (1944–
1948) (published in 1992 and translated into English in 1996 as 
Natural Science of the Human Species: An Introduction to Comp-
arative Behavorial Research. The “Russian Manuscript” 1944–1948) 
and Vergleichende Verhaltensforschung: Grundlagen der Ethologie 
(published in 1978; revised English translation as The Foundations 
of Ethology in 1981).  
Bigger part of this paper will be dealing with the writings of the pre-
war period and the 1948 conference, as these are the works where 
Uexküll’s influence is particularly evident. 
                                                 
1  When they are available, the author quotes from the English translations of 
Lorenz’ works. As far as Companionship in Bird Life is concerned, the author has 
modified the original translation (Lorenz 1964) in one point (he has rendered 
“Funktionskreis” with “functional circle” instead of “functional cycle”). 
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The pre-war period 
  
The first group of the works we are going to deal with includes those 
written during the pre-World War II period, specifically Companion-
ship in Bird Life (Lorenz 1964[1935]) and Die angeborenen Formen 
möglicher Erfahrung (Lorenz 1943). Before analysing the writings in 
detail, it is important to understand the personal relationship between 
the two scientists. The young Lorenz knew in depth the main works 
written by Uexküll in the years after World War I, especially Umwelt 
und Innenwelt der Tiere (Uexküll 1909), and began an intense cor-
respondence with the Estonian biologist. In 1935 Lorenz dedicated the 
dissertation Companionship in Bird Life to Uexküll, for his 70th birth-
day. In the same year, when he was already fairly well known in Ger-
many, Lorenz was contacted by Uexküll, who was at the time the 
director of the Institut für Umweltforschung of the University of 
Hamburg and wanted to appoint him as his successor. 
Lorenz responded positively to the proposal but in the end did not 
obtain the position because of reasons that were beyond both his and 
Uexküll’s control — among which was the position the two scientists 
took towards the National-Socialist regime (see Taschwer, Föger 2001). 
The respect between the two scientists was mutual, as is proved by the 
wide space Uexküll devoted to Lorenz’s experiences with birds in 
Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen (Uexküll 
1934)2. World War II and the death of Uexküll interrupted this 
relationship. 
                                                 
2  The book was published in 1934 and translated in English in 1957 as A Stroll 
Through the Worlds of Animals and Men (see Uexküll 1964). In the preface to this 
work, Uexküll writes: “Zu besonderem Dank sind wir Dr. K. Lorenz verpflichtet, 
der durch Übersendung der Bilder, die seine reiche Erfahrungen an Dohlen und 
Staren erläutern, unsere Arbeit sehr gefördert hat” (“We are particularly grateful 
to Dr. K. Lorenz, who sent us the images that illustrate his rich experiences on 
jackdows and starlings and in this way stimulated our work”; Uexküll 1956 : 22). 
The preface was written in December 1933. 
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Let us now analyse the 1935’s work Companionship in Bird Life. In 
the Introduction, Lorenz illustrates the main topic of his work: what 
does it mean to perceive an object? And, especially, what is the 
difference in general between the perception of objects in animals and 
men? These questions draw directly from the premises of Uexküll’s 
work, which can be defined as a phenomenological-representational 
perspective; the definition intentionally refers to Helmuth Plessner, 
who stated that Uexküll’s scientific program was to give a “pheno-
menology of the living behaviour” of animals (Plessner 1975: 63). In 
particular, Uexküll’s phenomenology of animal behaviour seeks to 
answer the question: “how do the acting animals feel and perceive the 
surrounding-world (Umwelt)?3” This question can be approached 
from two different points of view: trying to find the amplitude of the 
perception of the animal (for example trying to determine the 
spectrum of light or colours that the animal perceives), or trying to 
establish the category substratum of the perception, the formal struc-
ture in which the data of perception are organized. The first perspec-
tive deals with the quantity of environment that the sensory organs 
open up for the animal, the second (the one Uexküll is more interested 
in) aims at defining the way in which the mind of the animal 
interprets the perceived world. This issue raises many more crucial 
interrogatives in Uexküll’s work, about the way the animal unifies the 
sensory data, the elements it associates, the characters he gives priority 
to and those it considers as secondary. And again: is the animal’s mind 
capable of creating representations of the action in which the animal is 
involved? Can the animal understand the aim of its action?  
We will not discuss these issues in depth, but it is useful now to 
remember what forms the background of Uexküll’s thought: a careful 
                                                 
3  In order to maintain a clear terminological distinction between “environment” 
in the ordinary sense and Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt, for the latter (besides the 
German word) the author uses the term “surrounding-world”. The choice is based 
on the terminology adopted in the English translation of Uexküll’s Theoretische 
Biologie (see Uexküll 1926: 127). 
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and original re-reading of Kant’s opus. Uexküll firmly believed that 
through his work “die Biologie hat endgültig Anschluss an die Lehre 
Kants gewonnen, die sie in der Umweltlehre durch Betonung der 
entscheidenden Rolle der Subjekte naturwissenschaftlich ausbeuten 
will” (Uexküll 1956 : 13)4. 
The Kantian language (through the mediation of Uexküll) is clearly 
recognizable even in the introduction to Companionship in Bird Life, 
where Lorenz writes that “what we ordinarily call an object [Gegen-
stand] is created in our environment in somewhat the following way: 
we gather the stimuli that come to us from one thing, and refer them 
collectively to that thing [Ding] as a common source of stimulation” 
(Lorenz 1964: 83). At the same time the stimuli perceived and unified 
in the thing are projected in the outside space in a shape that Lorenz 
describes as their “inherent spatial coherence”, which “gives a ‘thing’ 
its objective unity” (Lorenz 1964: 83). As Lorenz notes, this mutual 
belonging is at the basis of the definition of object in Uexküll: “an 
object is that which moves in unison” (Lorenz 1964: 83). The organi-
zation of perception typical to men is therefore the objective-unitary 
grasp of things, which in this way appear to be characterized by 
identity and persistence in time. 
The behaviour of animals, Lorenz continues, appears instead not to 
be based on the identity of the perceived object: in different life-
situations the object could not be recognized as identical. This is 
something that is striking to the human observer especially when the 
thing which is not recognized — the offspring, the brother, the partner, 
etc. — bears an intrinsic similitude to the perceptive subject (see also 
Lorenz 1931). In Companionship in Bird Life, Lorenz deals specifically 
with the recognition of single objects in life-situations: 
 
                                                 
4  “Biology has definitively found a connection to Kant’s theory, which it wants 
to apply, in a naturalistic perspective, to the theory of the surrounding-world 
(Umweltlehre) by stressing the decisive role of subjects”. 
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Judging from their general behaviour, we must credit higher animals 
with an objective grasp of their world. One might expect that they also 
had an objective picture of the objects of all their instinctive activities. 
This should be particularly true where the object of a reaction is a fellow 
member of the species. Strangely enough, however, this does not seem 
the case. I venture to offer an explanation of why it is even less a 
biological necessity for fellow members of the species to retain their 
subjective identity as releasers in various functional circles than it is for 
the object of other instincts. (Lorenz 1964: 86) 
 
It is extremely interesting that here Lorenz employs the term 
functional circles [Funktionskreis], which is typical of Uexküll. Uexküll 
uses this term to describe the set of sensory and behavioural 
connections that are corresponding to a biologic function: the main 
functional circles in the life of animals are local movement, the search 
for food, the flight or defence from an enemy, the search for a sexual 
partner, reproduction and (in the social species) the interaction with 
the fellow members. In Uexküll, the functional circles are separate 
worlds, in which different objects and qualities of the natural environ-
ment are highlighted. 
The differences between the species are noticeable; in general, the 
functional circles are richer or poorer of environment elements (which 
Uexküll divides in receptor cues and effector cues, Merkmale and Wirk-
male) according to animal’s degree of complexity. There are animals 
which have a simple vital cycle, for example ticks who live the majority 
of their lives in a very poor sensory world: they can spend in a bush up 
to several years waiting for a determined sensory element (body 
warmth, odour of butyric acid) coming from a mammal passing by. 
From this moment on the tick will experience a series of receptor cues 
and effector cues, which are never more than two at the same time but 
are sufficient to complete the action (Uexküll 1956: 136)5. In other 
                                                 
5  See also Uexküll’s Theoretische Biologie, in which the author drew a 
methodological advice for human observers from the species-specificity of 
perception: “die Sonne, die einen Mückenschwarm tanzen läßt, ist nicht die 
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animal species instead, especially the social species, the functional 
circles — feeding, courtship, reproduction, hierarchical interaction 
with fellow members — happen quickly in sequences, without inter-
ruptions, and they are richer in sensory elements and elements for the 
action. 
In Companionship in Bird Life, Lorenz examines five functional 
circles of the social kind which can be observed among birds: these are 
centred on the parent companion (Elternkumpan), on the brother/ 
sister companions, on the fellow members of the group, on the sex 
companion, on the offspring. Lorenz highlights how to every relation-
ship situation corresponds on the one side a peculiar constellation of 
emerging stimuli brought by the fellow members, and on the other 
side the setting in motion of releasing schemes (auslösende Schemata, 
according to Lorenz’s terminology) and innate behaviours (among 
them the mechanism of imprinting that finds here one of its first 
extensive expositions). For example, the parenting behaviours are 
induced in parents by the peculiar colour at the inside of the beak of 
the offspring or by their specific movements (Lorenz calls them the 
‘begging’ movements); the same happens in the sequences of beha-
viour linked to courtship and reproduction, in the hierarchical 
relations between social animals, etc. 
Basically, what interests Lorenz in this work is the problem of the 
recognition of the individual. It is in order to explain this point that 
Lorenz uses Uexküll’s categories: “Jakob von Uexküll coined the term 
Kumpan (companion) for a fellow member of the species who is only 
treated identically in one functional circle, and I have adopted this 
term for the present paper” (Lorenz 1964). In fact, Lorenz, too, be-
                                                                                                    
unsere, sondern eine Mückensonne, die ihr Dasein dem Mückenauge verdankt. 
Wir können von der Mückensonne aber nichts aussagen, bevor wir die 
Planmäßigkeit der Mückenwelt durchschaut haben” (“the sun that makes a swarm 
of mosquitos dance is not our sun, it is a mosquito-sun whose existence is due to 
the eye of the mosquitos. We cannot say anything about the mosquito-sun till we 
have understood the teleology of the mosquito-world” Uexküll 1928: 233). 
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lieves that the functional circles are different according to the different 
features highlighted in the study of the functional circles in social life, 
where the emerging features are represented by the characters of the 
fellow member: colours, acoustic signals, body movements. There can 
be situations in which a bird, interacting with the same fellow member 
but in different functional circles (for example first in the functional 
circle of hierarchical relations, afterwards in courtship), might react in 
the two situations to a different combination of stimuli and might not 
be aware that it is interacting with the same individual.  
We shall now turn our attention to the 1943’s work Die an-
geborenen Formen möglicher Erfahrung. It is necessary to keep in mind 
the different nature of this work: if Companionship in Bird Life was an 
exposition and an interpretation of data gathered during Lorenz’s 
experimental research on birds, in which the author used concepts 
from Uexküll, Die angeborenen Formen der möglichen Erfahrung is an 
epistemological naturalistic work, which tries to explain the categories 
of human thought according to an evolutionary scheme, showing its 
phylogenesis and its adaptation value. 
Lorenz wrote Die angeborenen Formen der möglichen Erfahrung in 
the brief period while he was working at Königsberg University. 
Lorenz was called to teach at Königsberg in 1940, as the professor of 
human psychology. That a Darwinian biologist and researcher of 
animal behaviour would be appointed the professor of human 
psychology was seen by many as a sign of the times. The main sup-
porters of the prestigious appointment were the philosopher Baum-
garten — who appreciated Lorenz for his scientific merits but also, 
pragmatically, for his agreement with the dominant cultural atmo-
sphere — and Heirich Harmjanz, who was responsible for the SS office 
of biology, race and heredity. The story behind Lorenz’s appointment 
is complicated. Because of the Nazifizierung of Austrian universities 
two professors had been transferred to Wien, so in the German city 
there were some positions available, one of which gave an opportunity 
to the Austrian scientist (for further details see Taschwer, Föger 2001). 
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To return to the main theme of this paper, it is important to notice 
that during the Königsberg years Lorenz uses significantly less Uex-
küll’s definitions, while the concepts present in the Gestaltpsychologie 
on the one side, and his own ethological concepts on the other become 
more and more important for him. In an important passage of Die 
angeborenen Formen der möglichen Erfahrung, Lorenz takes a critical 
stand towards the ideas of the Estonian biologist: 
 
Was wir nun in geduldiger Einzelforschung zu leisten haben, ist ein 
genaues Studium und ein Vergleich der Funktion möglichst vieler und 
möglichst verschiedener Weltbildapparaturen, in ganz ähnlicher Metho-
dik, wie es die von Uexküllsche Umweltforschung in Angriff nahm, aber 
mit genau umgekehrtem Ziele, denn wir wollen ja eben jener einzigen, 
allen Subjekten gleicherweise zugeordneten außen-subjektiven Wirk-
lichkeit näherkommen, deren Existenz von der Umweltlehre Uexkülls 
grundsätzlich geleugnet wird. (Lorenz 1943: 353) 
 
What we have to carry out now, with a patient work of case by case 
research, is an exact study and a comparison of the functions of as many 
and as different apparatuses of world-images as possible, with a method 
that is very similar to Uexküll’s research on the surrounding-world, but 
with the inverse goal. In fact, we want to go closer to that unique reality 
which is extra-subjective and common to every subject, and the existen-
ce of which is basically denied by Uexküll’s theory of the surrounding-
world. 
 
Where does the contrast that Lorenz highlights between the research 
practice on the Umwelt and the theory of the Umwelt come from? The 
problem can be summed up in the following way. According to Lorenz 
the reason why Uexküll emphasises the radical separation between the 
surrounding-worlds of the various animal species (by surrounding-
world here he means the set of functional circles of each species) is 
that he is, following Kant, convinced that the reality behind the 
perception of features of the various species is impossible to grasp in 
itself. The cognitive structures of each species are therefore a barrier 
limiting the “world” which, as a consequence, does not correspond to 
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the true reality, nor is the same for animals belonging to different 
species. Lorenz criticizes them in Uexküll, but those arguments were 
already arguable in Kant: both accept that a thing can exist in itself and 
be unknown, and both limit the subject in a circle of transcendental 
representations (about his view on Kant, see also Lorenz 1941). 
The theoretical foundation of Lorenz’s critique is Darwin’s theory 
of evolution by natural selection, which Uexküll did not support; Lo-
renz instead based his ethology on it (and, curiously enough, on Nico-
lai Hartmann’s ontology; see Berlingeri 2009). According to Lorenz, 
the relation between the cognitive structures of the living beings, no 
matter how complex they might be, and the extra-subjective reality is 
the result of a gradual and uninterrupted process of adaptation. This 
relation, after all, depends on the fact that an eventual loss of touch 
with the extra-subjective reality would be sanctioned by the danger of 
extinction for the species in which it happens. To give an example, for 
Lorenz the category of cause — which according to Kant is 
“prescribed” to the world by the subject, who shapes the reality — 
cannot be unrelated to the real relations between objects and events of 
the extra-subjective world, as the behaviour based on this category 
runs the risk to lose effect. Lorenz’s criticism to the thesis of the 
“isolation of the Umwelten” based on Darwin’s evolutionary theory is 
clear in the 1943’s essay where, nevertheless, it is directed more 
towards Kant than Uexküll (Lorenz 1935: 352).  
This is perhaps explained by the circumstances of the essay’s 
redaction (Lorenz taking the University seat which was once Kant’s), 
but also by Lorenz’s interest in maintaining a good relationship with 
Uexküll. To develop this critique in depth would have meant for 
Lorenz to deal directly with Uexküll’s anti-darwinism: if the Estonian 
biologist believed in the different surrounding-worlds of each species, 
this was due not only to the influence of Kant, but also to his view of 
animal species as fixed and unchanging realities. Where Uexküll deals 
with the origin and differences between animal species, he limits 
himself to attributing them to the general teleology of nature and its 
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“active factors”, the Baupläne or plans of construction (which also 
perform the task of keeping the mutual relationship among species in 
harmony). In case of a direct confrontation on these issues, the 
distance between the two scientists would have fully surfaced and the 
gap would have been impossible to fill. It might even be that Lorenz 
did not want to draw attention to Uexküll’s anti-darwinism as Darwin 
was an important part of the Nazi ideology. 
 
 
The conference of 1948:  
Referat über J. v. Uexküll 
 
The unpublished oral paper Referat über J. v. Uexküll, of 1948, is the 
only work Lorenz devoted to a complete evaluation of the biological 
key concepts of Uexküll.6 The paper is pervaded by Lorenz’ idea that 
in Uexküll there is a stark contrast between the practice of field re-
search [Umweltforschung] and the theory of the surrounding-world 
[Umweltlehre]. It is worth quoting its incipit, which resumes well the 
complexity of Lorenz’s attitude towards Uexküll: 
 
Uexküll — Vitalist der Vitalisten, wütender Idealist, Kantianer — 
eigentlicher Feind der Naturforschung, denn “die Umwelt jedes Men-
schen ist getrennt von der jedes anderen”, eine Art Monadologie [...], 
und wenn man seine philosophisch-weltanschaunliche Sachen liest, 
stellt man als Naturforscher sämtliche Haare auf. Aber mit jenem 
Doppelleben, das idealistische Naturforscher so oft haben, ist er auf der 
anderen Seite der exakteste physiologische Experimentator, den Sie sich 
vorstellen können. — Eigensinnig bis leicht spinnend, genial bis in die 
Fingerspitzen. (Lorenz 1948: 1) 
 
                                                 
6  The paper, which is dated 19.X.1948, is conserved in the Lorenz-Archiv of the 
KLI-Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research of Altenberg (Austria). The 
paper, an unpublished transcription by Hilde Fürnsinn of a seminary by K. Lorenz, 
has been presented by Klaus Taschwer (see Mildenberger 2005: 431). 
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Uexküll — vitalist among the vitalists, ferocious idealist, Kantian — a 
proper enemy of the natural research, because “anyone’s surrounding-
world is separated from that of any other”, a kind of monadology [...], 
and when you read his philosophical works on his world view, you 
become horrified as a natural scientist. But, with the doublesideness that 
idealistic-minded natural scientists frequently have, on the other side he 
is the most exact researcher in physiology that you can imagine. — 
Stubborn to the point of being slightly crazy, genial till the fingertips.   
 
The whole paper is built on the alternation of criticisms and favorable 
statements. On the one hand Uexküll is described as a vitalist and an 
enemy of the descendence theory — “Anpassung gibt es bei ihm nicht, 
weil es keine Entwicklung, keine Stammesgeschichte gibt für ihn, alle 
Tiere sind Gegebenheiten für ihn — daher der Bauplan ein Schöpfungs-
wunder, an der er nicht näher rührt und herankommt”7 (Lorenz 1948: 
1) — on the other we find the precise exposition of Uexküll’s main 
biological concepts, from that of the functional circle to the notion of 
Umwelt. Lorenz is an enthusiastic admirer of the latter part of 
Uexküll’s work. In this paper he even claims that if Uexküll had only 
elaborated that part, it would be possible to consider him a sort of 
“good behaviourist”. Its vitalistic approach, writes Lorenz, 
 
hindert aber Uexküll nicht, jetzt fabelhaft genaue Beschreibungen von 
Tieren zu geben, kausalanalytisch. Wenn man das Vorherige nicht 
gelesen hat, glaubt man, das ist ein vollständig objektivierender Beha-
viorist, nur dass er nicht ganzheitsblind ist, sondern das Tier in seiner 
Anpassung in die Umwelt sieht. (Lorenz 1948: 3) 
 
does not prevent Uexküll from giving incredibly exact descriptions of 
animals in a causal-analytic way. If you hadn’t read the previous part, 
you could believe that he is a wholly objective-minded behaviourist, 
                                                 
7  “According to him there is no adaptation, because there is neither 
development nor phylogenesis for him; all animals are fixed entities for him — for 
this reason the construction-plan is a miracle of creation to which he won’t get 
closer with his enquiry”. 
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with the only difference that he is not blind to the entirety, but can see 
the animal in his adaptation to the surrounding-world.  
 
This statement is extremely meaningful. We know that Lorenz criti-
cizes harshly American behaviourism, accusing it of studying animals 
only in a lab, forcing them to behave outside their natural environ-
ment and, as a consequence, to develop only mechanical reactions to 
artificial stimuli and no true behavioural sequences (see Lorenz 1996: 
199–201). Acknowledging Uexküll’s research as a development of 
modern science means, in other words, to consider it a step further, 
beyond the limitations of behaviourism; and this is due to the fact that 
Uexküll was able to understand the animal in its entirety as a living 
organism in relation to their surrounding-world.  
But let us come to the main critical issue of Lorenz’s paper. Here 
we find what was missing in the work of 1943: a direct and explicit 
connection between the Uexküll’s Kantianism and the consequences 
that this philosophical position has on his scientific work. Besides 
defining Uexküll’s idea of the separation of the Umwelten as a kind of 
“monadology”, in the Referat über J. v. Uexküll of 1948 Lorenz says 
that Uexküll’s image of the world is “multi-mundane”: 
 
Uexküll glaubt nicht an die Außenwelt, glaubt, dass die Sonne nicht 
wirklich am Himmel steht, sondern jeder seine eigene Sonne hat, er 
leugnet die Existenz einer absoluten Welt. “Multimundanes Weltbild”. 
Welt eines Tieres: das, was in seinem Zentralnervensystem repräsentiert 
ist von den Außendingen. (Lorenz 1948: 4) 
 
Uexküll doesen’t believe in the external world, he believes that the sun 
isn’t really in the middle of the sky, so that everyone has his own sun, he 
denies the existence of an absolute world. “Multimundane world view”. 
World of an animal: the part of the external things which is represented 
in its central nervous system. 
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But the most indicative statement is perhaps the following: 
 
Uexküll behauptet, die höheren Gehirne kennen die Welt nicht nur 
durch eine Zeichensprache, sondern spiegeln sie im Räumlichen ihres 
Gehirns wider — das ist die “Gegenwelt”. — Wenn ein Tier räumlich 
einen feindlichen Gegenstand sieht, flieht er nicht mehr von einem Reiz, 
sondern von einem Bild des Dinges. Der motorische Teil des Nerven-
system hat seine Beziehung zum Umwelt verloren. Erregungen nur 
mehr aus zweiter Hand, aus einer neuen Erregungswelt zwischen Um-
welt und Zentralnervensystem. Er reagiert auf das Bild. (Lorenz 1948: 5) 
 
Uexküll claims that the superior brains know the world not only 
through a language of signs, but they reflect it again in the spatial 
dimension of their brain — this is the “opposite world”. — When an 
animal sees a hostile object in a spatial way, it does no more run away 
from a stimulus, but from the image of a thing. The motoric part of the 
nervous system has lost every connection to the surrounding-world. 
Now there are only stimulations of second hand, they come from a new 
stimulatory-world between surrounding-world and central nervous 
system. It [the motoric part of the nervous system] reacts to the image. 
 
It is clear here that what Lorenz disagrees on is not the idea of the 
semiotic relation between animal and Umwelt (for the term 
Zeichensprache see Uexküll 1909: 192), but the hypothesis that the use 
of a language of signs leads to the formation of a second world which 
is separated from the natural environment. Again we find the idea that 
the neural and cognitive structures of each species, and the stimuli 
they mediate, are a kind of a subjective prison from which living 
beings cannot break away. At the end of the paper, Lorenz is very 
critical towards Uexküll’s idea that “die Reize der Umwelt um-
schließen das Tier wie eine Mauer gegen die ganze fremde Welt”8 
(Lorenz 1948: 6): 
 
                                                 
8  “The stimuli of the surrounding world enclose the animal like a wall against 
the whole alien world”. 
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Ich würde sagen: Durch diese Umwelt erfährt [das Tier] eben von der 
Welt, wenn auch ein ziemlich grobes Modell. Tiere und Menschen 
haben ein verschiedenes, aber doch übereinstimmendes Modell. Wie 
Uexküll trotzdem auf den absurden Gedanken kommen kann, an der 
Realität und relativen Merkbarkeit der Außenwelt zu zweifeln, ist mir 
unverständlich und ärgert mich so wahnsinnig. (Lorenz 1948: 6) 
 
I would say: it is exactly through this surrounding-world that [the 
animal] experiences the world, even if it is quite an approximative 
model. Animals and men have a different yet overlapping model. How, 
despite of this, Uexküll could conceive his absurd doubt about the 
reality and the relative perceivability of the external world, this is not 
understandable for me and irritates me so much. 
 
In synthesis, in the Referat of 1948 Uexküll is appreciated for his work 
as a researcher on the field, and heavily criticized for both the episte-
mological consequences of his theory of Umwelt, and his teleological 
approach. The criticism we are more interested in, and that has to be 
examined more closely in the conclusion of this paper, was specifically 
directed to that part of the theory of Umwelt which enclosed all 
subjects into the walled confinement of their own representations and 
categories. 
 
The post-war period 
 
In Behind the Mirror, Lorenz (1977) gathers a large part of the mate-
rials previously published in Die angeborenen Formen der möglichen 
Erfahrung (1943). The choice to rework the essay of 1943 was due to 
two reasons: on the one hand, the aim was to add the data of the more 
recent scientific experiments and, on the other, there was a need to 
“clean” the terminology that was too near to the Nazi language. We 
cannot discuss here Lorenz’s participation in the Nazi ideology but it 
appears pretty clear that in 1973 Lorenz could not publish chapters 
entitled Die Selektion der Unerwünschte [The selection of the un-
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desired] or Der Wert der Reinrassigkeit [The value of the purity of the 
race]. 
In the general reorganization of the work, the references to Uexküll 
are maintained (for example the definition of the subject as “what 
moves in unison” in the environment) but they are only used to 
strengthen other argumentations. Lorenz also avoids exposing his 
main criticism of Uexküll: the accusation of “solipsism” (which is, 
instead, directed again towards Kant). The general impression is that 
Uexküll is less important in this work, both as a positive model for 
field research and as a negative referent. 
Starting with Natural Science of the Human Species: An Intro-
duction to Comparative Behavorial Research (The Russian Manuscript 
1944–1948) and in the following essays, Lorenz criticizes Uexküll 
more directly, as a vitalist and supporter of finalistic harmonical 
causes, in the name of a contingent view of evolution. Lorenz bases his 
critique on two main arguments. 
Firstly, as he never explains the origin of species, Uexküll never 
gives reasons for their extinction. Lorenz agrees with Uexküll on one 
important issue: those who believe that the natural selection lead to an 
increasing perfection in adapting, indicating that superior organism 
and men would be more adaptable than inferior species, make a 
fundamental mistake. Against this mistake, which is not due to 
Darwin, but to those who tried to interpret his work, Lorenz writes:  
 
The species-preserving purposivity of higher organism is no greater than 
that of the lowest forms of life, and Jakob von Uexküll was entirely 
justified in stating that all living organisms are equally well adapted to 
their environments. In fact, one could more justifiably reverse the 
widespread view and state that the survival of higher forms of life is ge-
nerally more threatened than that of lower organism. (Lorenz 1996: 93) 
 
Once the faith in nature’s teleology is lost, Uexküll’s thesis on the re-
ciprocal relation of adaptation (Einpassung) between organism and en-
vironment is still true but it is limited by the possibility of extinction 
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(caused by a sudden change in the climate or because of the arrival of a 
new species). 
Secondly, a similar critique is directed by Lorenz to the “doubt-
lessly exaggerated claim” of Uexküll according to which  
 
there are in fact no rudimentary organs. When faced with such tenets, 
which are always guided by the vitalistic belief that all living organisms 
are occupied by a directing “factor”, one must always remember the 
principle stated above, that even nonfunctional features may be 
preserved as long as they present no threat for the survival of the species. 
(Lorenz 1996: 129) 
 
In both arguments we find an attempt at arguing those harmonizing 
teleological factors with Darwin’s thesis of accident and contingency 
of evolution, testified both by the possibility of extinction and by the 
presence of “attempts” at evolving (the rudimentary organs) which 
have not yet a value as adaptation. 
In the same work there is also a very relevant remark about what 
can be referred to as the ambiguity of Uexküll. According to Lorenz, 
the Estonian biologist was a typical vitalist in his theoretical thought, 
and a crypto-mechanist in his empirical work as a researcher: 
 
It is a question of belief whether one feels in one’s heart that there is 
something supernatural that is immune to research. As a researcher, 
however, one must be a mechanist. Even the great vitalistic natural 
scientists, ranging from Müller and Bernard to Uexküll and Driesch, 
arrived at their greatest and most enduring achievements in cases where 
they approached life processes with purely mechanistic working hypo-
theses. As researchers, they too were mechanists! (Lorenz 1996: 195–6) 
 
In order to reach a correct understanding of this quotation, it is 
necessary to point out that here mechanicism does not coincide with 
reductionism: Lorenz thought that biology cannot be reduced to a 
branch of physics or chemistry, but what he wants to underline here, is 
the importance of explaining biological phenomena with scientifically 
observed prior causes (excluding every teleological factor). 
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Even in The Foundation of Ethology, which is a seminal work 
defining the scientific autonomy of ethology, we find a clear example 
of the distinction Lorenz makes between a good practice of field 
research and a bad theory of the surrounding-world. Here the praising 
references to Uexküll’s work (Lorenz defines classic the research on 
tick, on sea urchin and on jellyfish) and the criticism to vitalism 
coexist. In order to discuss this second aspect, following quotations are 
very helpful: 
 
Every “learned behavior” does contain phylogenetically acquired 
information [...]. Whoever denies this must assume a prestabilized 
harmony between the environment and the organism to explain the fact 
that learning — apart from some instructive failures — always reinforces 
teleonomic behavior and extinguishes unsuitable behavior. Whoever 
makes himself blind to the facts of evolution arrives inevitably at the 
assumption of a prestabilized harmony, as have the cited behaviorists 
and that great vitalist, Jakob von Uexküll. (Lorenz 1981: 10) 
 
The assumption made by Kuo (1932) and other behaviorists, that the 
mechanisms of learning “know” without any previous experience what 
is and what is not useful for the organism, contains the covert 
postulation of a prestabilized harmony to which the great vitalist, Jakob 
von Uexküll, overtly testifies. If one does not believe in miracles — and a 
prestabilized harmony would be one such — it remains simply 
incomprehensible where, for example, within the aquarium in which the 
young stickleback was reared — among the diversity of its animal and 
plant world — the information should be contained that the rival to be 
attacked is red on the ventral side. (Lorenz 1981: 58) 
 
As we have seen in order to define the vitalistic faith in final causes 
which “tuned” organism and environment, Lorenz uses strong expres-
sions like “miracles” and “prestabilized harmony”. For Lorenz, the gap 
between him and Uexküll is now impossible to bridge. 
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Conclusion 
 
In the work of Lorenz we find a moment of great concordance with 
Uexküll, which can be traced back to the first half of the 1930s, 
followed by a progressive distance and by the occurrance of more and 
more critical statements. The moment of greater cohesion between 
Lorenz’s and Uexküll’s research approach is the pre-war period, and 
especially the work Der Kumpan, which is focused on the concept of 
companion, functional circles, Merkmale and Wirkmale. This essay 
was written at the time when Lorenz was hoping to become a member 
of the Institut für Umweltforschung directed by Uexküll; perhaps this 
was the reason why the differences between the two scientists (which 
were already evident as Lorenz proclaimed his Darwinism since the 
beginning of the 1920s) were not exposed by Lorenz. The conference 
paper of 1948, Referat über Jakob von Uexküll, marks a great change in 
Lorenz’s evaluation of Uexküll, and in the years after World War II 
the influence of the Estonian biologist is greatly diminished, even 
though Lorenz persists in stressing his admiration for particular 
studies of his. References to Uexküll’s work are less and far in between, 
while the difference is highlighted between the Uexküllian theoretical 
frame (vitalistic) and Lorenz’s one (evolutionist, Darwinian but not 
reductionist). 
As far as the critical attitude of Lorenz towards Uexküll is con-
cerned, we can identify two tendencies which have to be kept distinct. 
The first is a biologic one: Lorenz heavily criticizes Uexküll’s vitalism 
and his faith in harmonizing forces and supernatural factors. The 
second is an epistemological one: Lorenz, arguing from the point of 
view of critical realism, accuses Uexküll of postulating the separateness 
of all living beings, a separateness which is due to the Kantian idea that 
every subject of knowledge and action is imprisoned in the circle of its 
transcendental representations. The literature of the last years has 
mainly stressed the first aspect of the critical attitude of Lorenz 
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towards Uexküll (see Mildenberger 2005), while I have chosen to focus 
on the second one. 
Let us go deeper into this point, in order to develop some final 
remarks. The epistemological critique based on the separateness of the 
species-specific sets of cognitive structures is an integral part of the 
process by which Lorenz’s ethology acquires an autonomous conceptual 
foundation of its own. Uexküll’s idea of the Umwelt as a harmonious set 
of perception features (Merkmale) and features for action (Wirkmale), 
for example, is substituted by the ethologic concept of instinctual 
behaviour in animals, caused by the interaction of specific stimuli on the 
one hand, and genetically transmitted uses on the other.  
As a general trend, after the war Lorenz shows a diminished 
interest towards the study of the representative-phenomenological 
aspect of animal behaviour. The attention to the ways in which the 
sensory stimuli are organized (for example the recognition of the 
identity in objects on the part of the subject) leaves space to the 
objective study of the provoking stimuli and of the physiological states. 
The aims of research are unrelated to the discussion of how the animal 
categorizes the perceived objects; Lorenz concentrates on establishing 
the “values-limits” of stimuli and the greater or smaller reaction of 
animals in various natural and artificial situations. This might lead us 
to think that he began to consider the problem of categorization as 
unessential or unsolvable. It is quite important, at this stage, to take 
into account the brief essay of 1963, Haben Tiere ein subjektives 
Erleben? [Do Animals have a Subjective Experience?], in which Lorenz 
excludes the possibility of understanding the subjective experience of 
animals from the observation of their behaviour.9 
                                                 
9  If this animal behaviour research perspective becomes more and more secon-
dary in Lorenz’s writings, his concern with a similar problem (the phenomeno-
logical approach to complex animal behaviour) will still be a major part of his 
work. In order to explain the ability to recognize and differentiate the behaviour 
schemes of various species, Lorenz uses in all his works the Gestaltpsychologie; see 
for instance Lorenz 1981, in particular the second chapter of the work. 
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In this essay, the ethologist appears to be open only to two 
“indirect approaches” to the interior life of animals. The first one is the 
empathic approach, according to which man can be emphatic to 
superior animals and “feel [fühlen]” the meaning of their expression 
movements. In a similar way to that of the Austrian psychologist Karl 
Bühler, Lorenz defines this proximity mode of knowledge as “evidence 
of the other” and stresses how this becomes weaker as the evolution 
level of the animal becomes lower (Lorenz 1963: 369–388 and 371; 
Bühler 1922). The second indirect approach is “the empiric analysis of 
the neuronal processes in our own mind in connection to [specific] 
subjective experiences” (Lorenz 1963: 361) and in looking for similar 
results with animals. According to Lorenz this research is the field of 
study of neurobiology. He considered highly promising the research of 
Von Holst about the neuronal substratum of the single instincts and of 
the sequences of instinctive actions (Lorenz 1942: 380–388 and 346–
349, 390–393, 395). Both approaches are radically different from 
Uexküll’s theory about the inner world of animals and also from his 
concept of empirical practice (Umweltforschung). 
As we have seen, one of the crucial moments in the building of the 
critical attitude of Lorenz towards Uexküll is the conference paper 
Referat über Jakob von Uexküll, where what we have called the 
epistemological criticism found its first precise formulation. Yet in this 
paper Uexküll’s idea of a sign-based relation between animal and 
environment was still accepted; what Lorenz refused was the solipsistic 
result of the use of the signs by the living beings (depending on the 
Kantian basis of Uexküll’s perspective). After the paper of 1948, the 
behavioral relationship between animal and environment appears less 
to be based on a Zeichensprache than on the reaction to stimuli. At 
least as far as the instinctive behavior and the lower animals are con-
cerned, the problem of the sense of a behavioral situation is gradually 
replaced by that of the genetic programming of the behavioral mode 
itself. 
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Эпистемологический критицизм Конрада Лоренца по 
отношению к Якобу фон Юкскюллу 
 
В работах Конрада Лоренца можно выделить начальный период, где 
он  вполне соглашается с теорией умвельта Юкскюлла. Затем следует 
постепенный отход и все более критические заявления. Момент 
наибольшего согласия между Лоренцом и Юкскюллом представляет 
работа Лоренца Der Kumpan, которая сосредоточивается на поня-
тиях партнера, функционального цикла и социального умвельта. 
Большую перемену в отношении Лоренца к Юкскюллю знаменует 
доклад 1948 года Referat über Jakob von Uexküll, где Лоренц указывает 
на виталистские убеждения Юкскюлла. В работах после Второй 
мировой войны влияние эстонского биолога на Лоренца заметно 
уменьшается, хотя Лоренц и восхищается отдельными работами и 
концептами Юкскюлла. Ссылки на работы Юкскюлла редки,  ярко  
освещена граница между теоретическими взглядами Юкскюлла 
(витализм) и Лоренца (дарвинизм и эволюционизм). Критика Лорен-
ца развивается в основном по двум направлениям: биологическое и 
эпистемологическое. В плане биологии Лоренц гневно критикует 
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витализм Юкскюлла и его веру в гармонизирующие и сверхъесте-
ственные силы (что приводит к идеям о полной адаптации орга-
низмов к своей среде и отсутствия рудиментарных органов). В 
эпистемологии Лоренц (с точки зрения критического реализма) 
обвиняет Юкскюлла в том, что тот утверждает, будто все живые 
существа неизбежно разлучены друг с другом. Эта точка зрения опи-
рается на идею Канта о том, что каждый субъект знания и действия 
неизбежно является пленником трансцендентального цикла своих 
репрезентаций и отношений.      
 
 
Konrad Lorentzi epistemoloogiline kriitika  
Jakob von Uexkülli aadressil 
 
Konrad Lorenzi töödes näeme esmalt algusperioodi, kus ta on väga päri 
Uexkülli omailmateooriaga (Umweltehre), millele järgneb aga järk-järgu-
line kaugenemine ja üha kriitilisemad avaldused. Lorenzi ja Uexkülli 
vahelise suurima üksmeelsuse hetke esindab Lorenzi Der Kumpan, mis 
keskendub kaaslaste, funktsionaalsete tsüklite ja sotsiaalse omailma mõis-
tetele. Suurt muutust Lorenzi hinnangus Uexküllile tähistab 1948. aasta 
ettekanne Referat über Jakob von Uexküll, kus Lorenz juhib tähelepanu 
Uexkülli vitalistlikele seisukohtadele. Teise Maailmasõja järgsetes töödes 
väheneb eesti bioloogi mõju Lorenzile olulisel määral, ehkki Lorenz 
väljendab jätkuvalt oma imetlust Uexkülli teatud uurimustööde ja mõis-
tete suhtes. Viited Uexkülli töödele on harvad ning rõhutatakse erinevust 
Uexkülli (vitalistliku) ja Lorenzi (darwinistliku ja evolutsionistliku) teo-
reetilise raamistiku vahel. Lorenzi kriitika käib peamiselt kahes liinis: bio-
loogilises ja epistemoloogilises. Bioloogilisel poolel kritiseerib Lorenz 
vihaselt Uexkülli vitalismi ja tema usku harmoniseerivatesse jõududesse 
ning üleloomulikesse faktoritesse (mis toob endaga kaasa sellised ideed 
nagu kõikide bioloogiliste liikide täiuslik sulandumine oma keskkonda 
ning rudimentaarsete organite puudumine). Epistemoloogilise poole pealt 
süüdistab Lorenz, lähtudes kriitilise realismi vaatepunktist, Uexkülli selles, 
et ta väidab, et kõik elusolendid on üksteisest päästmatult lahus seisvad — 
seisukoht, mille aluseks on Kanti idee, et iga teadmise ja teo subjekt on 
päästmatult oma esituste ja suhtumiste transtsendentaalses tsüklis vangis. 
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